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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
How to provide agents with suﬃcient motivation to do what society — or its
proxy in the guise of a center or social planner — wants them to do is the subject
of incentive theory. The theory has normative force whenever, metaphorically
speaking, the invisible hand of the market fails to provide such motivation auto-
matically. Market failure can come about either because markets are imperfect
in some way or because they do not exist at all. Indeed, a leading example of a
non-market environment is the internal organization of a large corporation. Al-
fred Chandler (1977) made just this point when he gave his study of the modern
American enterprise the title The Visible Hand.
*A preliminary version of this paper was presented at a symposium in honor of Roy
Radner at Cornell University, June 1992. I thank the NSF for research support and a referee
for helpful comments.
1The study of these large enterprises — which itself is an enterprise that is
currently blossoming — has drawn on incentive theory in a fundamental way.
And it is not surprising that Roy Radner — who had a long-standing fascination
and more than casual personal acquaintance with large organizations — should
have been inspired to make important contributions to this theory.
In this essay, I shall provide an outline of some of the major results in
incentive theory with particular attention to Radner’s work on the subject.
2A S i m p l e M o d e l o f a T e a m
Let me begin with one of the ﬁrst formal attempts to model organizations, viz,
team theory, whose creation is due to Marschak and Radner (1972). Let Θ be
the set of possible states of the world, and for each θ ∈ Θ,l e tp(θ) be the prior
probability of θ.T h e r e a r e n agents, indexed by i =1 ,...,n. Each agent i has
an action space Ai and a private signal space Si. Both of these may in part
be exogenous and in part the choice of the team (or team “designer”). Si can
be thought of as a partition on Θ. That is, each signal si ∈ Si corresponds
t oas u b s e to fΘ. Given the vector of signals s =( s1,...,sn),l e tπ(θ | s) be
the distribution of θ (derived from p(θ) using Bayes’ rule) conditional on s.I n
addition to the n agents, the center (or CEO, social planner, etc.), whom we
shall designate as agent 0, may be an active participant, in which case he has
an action space A0 (for simplicity, let us assume, however, that he observes no
private signals, so that we can dispense with S0).
2The team is interested in implementing a collective choice rule,t h a ti s ,a
rule that speciﬁes all agents’ actions as a function of the available information
s. Thus a collective choice rule f is a mapping
f : S1 × ... × Sn → A0 × ... × An.
Much of team theory concerns the question of what constitutes the best way
for agents to communicate with one another in order to implement the desired
collective choice rule, assuming that communication is costly. A common sim-
plifying assumption in this theory is that all agents and the center share the
same objectives. Incentive theory, however, gains much of its interest from the
presumption the agents have diﬀerent preferences. Let us suppose that agent
i’s preferences can be represented by the (von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility
function
ui(a,θ),
where a =( a0,...,an). The fact agent i’s payoﬀ depends on other agents’
actions embodies the idea that there may be externalities to actions. Similarly,
the center has utility function
u0(a,θ),





Here λi is the “welfare weight” for agent i. Usually, in both team and incentive
theory, the function f is chosen to maximize the expectation of u0, i.e.,




u0(a,θ)π(θ | s). (1)
3 Adverse Selection
For the time being, let us drop the actions a1,...,an (but not a0). Then the
incentive problem is how to ensure that the center’s action a0 properly reﬂects
agents’ information s (in the sense of satisfying (1)), in view of the fact that
the signals are private information. Models like this, where the major substan-
tive diﬃculty is the private nature of information, are often called problems of
adverse selection (or hidden information).
The solution to an adverse selection problem is normally formulated as an
incentive mechanism (also variously called a “game form,” “outcome function,”
“contract,” or “constitution”). Suppose that each agent i is allocated a “mes-
sage” space Mi. A message mi ∈ Mi can be thought of as agent i’s announce-
ment about his signal si (but this interpretation is not necessary). Then an
incentive mechanism g is a function
g : M1 × ... × Mn → A0.
4We interpret this mechanism as specifying that the center will take action
g(m) ∈ A0 if the messages are m =( m1,...,mn). Thus g(m) is called the
outcome of the mechanism. For each vector of signals s,t h e r ew i l lb eac o r -
responding equilibrium (perhaps more than one) of the incentive mechanism
(where each agent i evaluates the outcome g(m) using his utility function ui).
Of course, exactly what an equilibrium is will depend on the solution concept
that pertains. For a given solution concept, let Eg(s) be the equilibrium out-
come (for simplicity, we suppose that the equilibrium outcome is unique). If,
for all s,
f(s)=Eg(s), (2)
we say that g implements f (or that f is implemented by g) with respect to
the solution concept. Much of the incentive literature consists of characteriz-
ing which social choice rules are implementable in this sense, with respect to
particular solution concepts.
4 Adverse Selection with Dominant Strategies
By far the simplest (and strongest) solution concept is equilibrium in dominant
strategies. Agent i with signal si has a dominant strategy mi(si) for mechanism





ui(g(mi,m −i),θ)πi(θ | si) for all m−i,
5where πi(θ | si) is the distribution of θ conditional on si and m−i is the vector
of other agents’ messages.
Having a dominant strategy makes life easy for agent i because it obviates the
need for him to form beliefs about what other players know and how they behave.
Clearly, requiring that an equilibrium be independent of beliefs is demanding.
Nevertheless, Groves (1973) showed that, in a special but important case of the
Marschak-Radner framework, there is a large class of collective choice rules that
are implementable. Speciﬁcally, suppose that the center’s action a0 takes the
form
a0 =( x,y1,...,yn),
where x can be interpreted as the choice of a public good and the yi’s (which
are scalars) are transfers of a private good (or money). Assume, moreover, that
each agent i’s utility takes the form
ui(a0,θ)=vi(x,si)+yi. (3)
That is, utility is quasi-linear. Then, as Groves demonstrated, any f(s)=
(x(s),y 1(s),...,yn(s)) for which




vi(x,si) for all s (4)





where s−i is the vector of signals excluding that of agent i and ki(·) is an
arbitrary function of s−i. (Notice that (4) is the requirement that the public
good be chosen to maximize social surplus.)
To see this, suppose that agents are confronted with a mechanism in which
each agent i is asked to report a signal value ˆ si ∈ Si and the outcome, given
reports ˆ s =( ˆ s1,..., ˆ sn),i s(x(ˆ s),y 1(ˆ s),...,yn(ˆ s)), where x(·) and (y1(·),...,yn(·))





⎣vi(x(ˆ si, ˆ s−i),s i)+
X
j6=i
vj(x(ˆ si, ˆ s−i), ˆ sj)+ki(ˆ s−i)
⎤
⎦. (6)
By varying ˆ si, agent i can vary x(ˆ si, ˆ s−i).B u t , b y d e ﬁnition of x(s),









Hence ˆ si = si solves (6). That is, it is a dominant strategy for agent i to tell
the truth, establishing that (x(s),y 1(s),...,yn(s)) is implementable.
Green and Laﬀont (1979) showed, in fact, that any implementable social
choice rule satisfying (4) must satisfy (5). To understand why this is so,1
notice ﬁr s tt h a ti fm e c h a n i s mg : M1 × ... × Mn → A0 implements a collective
1The following argument is drawn from Laﬀont and Maskin (1980).
7choice rule f in dominant strategies and if, for all i and all si, mi(si) is agent
i’s dominant strategy when his signal is si,t h e ng∗ where
g∗(s1,...,sn) ≡ g(m1(s1),...,mn(sn))
also implements f.2 Observe that g∗ is a “direct revelation” mechanism in the
sense that strategies consist of announcing a signal, and it is a dominant strategy
for agents to announce signals truthfully. Thus, it suﬃces to restrict attention to
direct revelation mechanisms when searching for mechanisms that implement a
collective choice rule. Now, suppose that f(s)=( x(s),y 1(s),...,y n(s)) satisﬁes
(4) and is implementable in dominant strategies. Suppose that, for all i, Si is an
open interval of real numbers, vi(·,·) is a twice diﬀerentiable function of x and
si (with ∂vi
∂x > 0, ∂2vi
∂x2 < 0,a n d ∂2vi
∂x∂si > 0), and x(·) and yi(·) are diﬀerentiable
functions of si. Since we can restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms,
the fact that f is implementable implies that, for all si and s−i,
si ∈ arg max
ˆ si










(si,s −i)=0 . (7)
Now from the above analysis, we know that one solution to the diﬀerential
2Actually, it is conceivable that, in going from g to g∗, we might introduce additional,
non-optimal equilibria. Although this is potentially a serious problem, we shall ignore it here
(but see Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979)).
8equation (7) is yi(s)=
P
j6=i vj(x(s),s j). Moreover, from the theory of diﬀer-
ential equations, we know that all solutions diﬀer by a constant ki(s−i). Hence,
we can conclude that (5) holds.
The form (3) embodies the assumption of private values: agent i’s payoﬀ
depends on θ only through his signal si, i.e., in particular, his payoﬀ does not
depend on s−i. If we relax this assumption and allow s−i to aﬀect vi,w e
are in the realm of common values. Radner and Williams (1988) showed that
f(s)=( x(s),y 1(s),...,yn(s)) can be implemented in dominant strategies even
when there are common values, if vi takes the form
vi(x,s)=wi(x,si)+zi(s). (8)
To see this, observe that when (8) holds and agent i is confronted with the direct




wj (x(ˆ sj, ˆ s−j), ˆ sj)+k  (ˆ s− ) for all  ,




⎣wi(x(ˆ si, ˆ s−i),s i)+zi(si,s −i)+
X
j6=i
wj(x(ˆ si, ˆ s−i), ˆ sj)+ki(ˆ s−i)
⎤
⎦. (9)
But because zi(si,s −i) does not depend on ˆ si, ˆ si = si solves (9), establishing
that it is a dominant strategy for i to tell the truth.
9Radner and Williams went a step further, in fact, and showed that, with com-
mon values, (8) must hold for a collective choice rule f(s)=( x(s),y 1(s),...,yn(s))
satisfying (4) to be implementable. To see this, let us make the same diﬀeren-
tiability assumptions as before (with the additional assumption that
∂2vj
∂x∂si ≥ 0
for j 6= i). Suppose that f is implementable by direct revelation mechanism
(x(ˆ s),y 1(ˆ s),...,yn(ˆ s)). Then, analogous to (7), we obtain the following ﬁrst-
order condition for agent i:
∂vi
∂x






(si, ˆ s−i) (10)
=0 for all si,s −i, and ˆ s−i.
Because ∂2vi
∂x∂si > 0, ∂2vi
∂x2 < 0,a n d
∂2vj
∂x∂si ≥ 0,w eh a v e ∂x
∂si > 0.3 Hence if, given
si and ˆ s−i, (10) is to hold for all s−i,w em u s th a v e ∂2vi
∂x∂s−i =0 . Hence, vi must
be additively separable between x and s−i, i.e., it takes the form (8).
5 Adverse Selection: Other Solution Concepts
The positive results for dominant strategies in the case of quasi-linear pref-
erences do not readily generalize to signiﬁcantly broader environments, as the
results of Gibbard (1973), Hurwicz (1972), and Satterthwaite (1975) make clear.
3To see this, note that the ﬁrst-order condition determining x(s) is
S ∂vj
∂x (x(s),s)=0 .













from which the conclusion follows.
10Accordingly, a large literature has developed in which various species of Nash
equilibrium (see Moore (1992) for a recent survey) or Bayesian equilibrium (see
Palfrey (1992)) are appealed to instead.
One principle that this literature makes clear is that typically the more that
Nash or Bayesian equilibrium is reﬁned — i.e., the more restrictive the deﬁnition
of equilibrium — the bigger the class of implementable collective choice rules
becomes. At ﬁrst this principle may seem at odds with the foregoing discussion.
After all, it was precisely because insuﬃciently many collective choice rules were
implementable in dominant strategies that the solution concept was relaxed.
The paradox is resolved, however, when one notices that, in order to satisfy
equation (2), not only must there be an equilibrium (a requirement which is
hard to satisfy when dominant strategy equilibrium is the solution concept) but
there must be no equilibrium outcomes other than f(s) (a requirement which
is more problematic for Nash and Bayesian equilibrium). By reﬁning the Nash
and Bayesian concepts (for which the existence of equilibrium is usually not a
problem), there is, therefore, hope of eliminating the unwanted equilibria.
6M o r a l H a z a r d
We temporarily left actions (a1,...,an) out of the model above in order to con-
centrate on pure adverse selection, but we can readily restore them to that model
if these actions are perfectly observable to the center. Indeed, in that case we
can regard (a1,...,an) as part of the center’s choice a0, since he can simply “or-
11der” agents to choose the desired actions. The more diﬃcult problem arises
when the ai’s are only imperfectly observable — the case of moral hazard.
Assume, therefore, that the center cannot observe (a1,...,a n) but only a
noisy signal z ∈ Z.L e t q(z | a1,...,an) be the distribution of z conditional
on (a1,...,an). We will think of the center as choosing a0 contingent on the
realization of z. Hence, it will be convenient to suppose that the agents ﬁrst
(and simultaneously) choose their actions, and that then, after z is realized, the
center chooses a0. Because I wish to focus on the case of “pure” moral hazard,
I will drop the signals s =( s1,...,sn). Hence, for i =0 ,1,...,n,w ec a nw r i t e




ui(a0(z),a 1,...,an)q(z | a1,...,an).
7 The Principal-Agent Relationship
Suppose that n =1(so that there is just one agent) and that the center’s payoﬀ





where r0(·,·) is a function of a0 and z. Assume, ﬁnally, that A0 consists of the
real numbers and that A1 is a set of nonnegative numbers (we can think of a0
as a monetary transfer and a1 as an eﬀort level). Then we are in the standard
principal-agent framework (the center is the principal).
12Let us ﬁrst consider the case in which the principal’s and agent’s payoﬀsa r e
linear in a0. Speciﬁcally suppose that
r0(a0,z)= z − a0
and
u1(a0,a 1)=a0 − 1
8a1,
where z is the output produced by the agent (and which accrues to the principal),
and a1 ∈ {0,1} (i.e., the agent can either “work” and set a1 =1 ,o r“ s h i r k ”a n d
set a1 =0 ). Let us suppose that if the agent works, there is an equal chance
of high (z =2 )o rl o w( z =0 ) output. But if he shirks, output is low for sure.
That is,
Pr{z =2| a1 =1 } =P r {z =0| a1 =1 } =
1
2
and Pr{z =0| a1 =0 } =1 .
Because expected net surplus from the agent’s working
¡1




it is eﬃcient for the agent to work (i.e., set a1 =1 ). Thus, because payoﬀs
are linear in a0, the Pareto frontier (the locus of Pareto optimal payoﬀs) is the
straight line v0+v1 = 7
8,w h e r ev0 and v1 are the principal’s and agent’s payoﬀs,
respectively. Now for the agent to be induced to work, his monetary payments



















Next, suppose instead that the Pareto frontier is nonlinear. Speciﬁcally,
assume that
r0(a0,z)= z − a0




but that the model is otherwise the same as before. Notice that the agent is
now risk-averse with respect to his monetary payment.
Observe that if a1 =0(i.e., the agent shirks), then either the principal’s or
the agent’s payoﬀ must be non-positive. Hence, assuming that a player has
the option not to participate if his payoﬀ is negative, it remains eﬃcient for
the agent to work, i.e., to choose a1 =1 . To derive the Pareto frontier, take
v0 ≡ r0 (a0,1) = 1 − a0 and v1 ≡ u1 (a0,1) = a0 − 1
4a2
0 − 1
8. Replacing a0 by









Because this curve is strictly concave, convex combination of points on the
frontier lie strictly below. This implies that points on the frontier can no longer
be sustained since in order to induce the agent to work it must be the case that
a2(2) >a 2(0); i.e., the agent’s payoﬀ is a convex combination of two diﬀerent
points.
14Suppose, however, that this principal-agent model is repeated inﬁnitely many
times and that players maximize their discounted sum of payoﬀs using discount























where, for each t, zt is the period-t realization of z and at
0 and at
1 are the choices
of a0 and a1 in period t.
Even in the repeated game, Pareto optimal points are unattainable as equi-
libria. To see this, note that if (v0,v 1) are the average payoﬀs4of a Pareto
optimal perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the repeated game, then






















are the ﬁrst period equilibrium payoﬀsa n d ,f o rz =0 ,2,(v0(z),v 1(z))
are the average continuation equilibrium payoﬀs (i.e., the average equilibrium







are a pair of total payoﬀs in the repeated game, then the corresponding average

























2 (v0(2),v 1(2))+ 1
2 (v0(0),v 1 (0)). But since Pareto optimality
requires that the agent be induced to work in the ﬁrst period, we must have
v1 (2) >v 1 (0). Moreover, because the Pareto frontier is strictly concave, this
implies that 1
2 (v0(2),v 1(2)) + 1
2 (v0 (0),v 1 (0)) cannot be Pareto optimal, and
so neither can (v0,v 1).
Nevertheless, as Radner (1981) and (1985) showed, any point in the interior
of the utility possibility set (the UPS is the set of payoﬀs that are feasible–
including those obtained by randomization–in the one-shot model), no matter
how close to the Pareto frontier, can be attained as the average payoﬀso fa
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the repeated game, provided that δ is
near enough 1. To see this, choose small ε>0 and consider the interior point
¡1
2 − ε, 5
16 − ε
¢





.L e t B be the ball of
radius ε around the point
¡1
2 − ε, 5
16 − ε
¢
. I will argue that, for δ near enough
1, any point (v0,v 1) in B can be “decomposed” in the sense that there exist a1
0
and
(v0(2),v 1(2)),(v0 (0),v 1 (0)) ∈ B, (13)
such that


















(v0 (2),v 1 (2)) +
1
2




































+ δv1 (0). (15)
Establishing that, for given δ, all points in B can be decomposed according
to (13)-(15) allows us to conclude that all points in B correspond to PBE’s for
discount factor δ. Indeed, we can iteratively construct the PBE corresponding
to (v0,v 1). Speciﬁcally, choose a0 = a1
0 and a1 =1as the ﬁrst-period actions.
Let (v0(2),v 1(2)) and (v0 (0),v 1 (0)) be the continuation payoﬀs after high and
low output respectively. Because (15) holds, the agent does not have the in-
centive to deviate from working. Hence, the ﬁrst-period behavior is consistent
with equilibrium. But from (13), both (v0(2),v 1(2)) and (v0 (0),v 1 (0)) can be
decomposed à la (13)-(15). These decompositions will determine the equilib-
rium second-period behavior following high and low output. Continuing in the
same way, we can derive the equilibrium behavior for all subsequent periods,
thereby completing the construction.
It remains, therefore, only to show that we can actually perform the decom-

















































Simple substitution veriﬁes that (14) and (15) hold when the values given
by (16)-(18) are used. As for (13), note that, because B is a ball, the vertical
distance from the point p =
³³
3















,i fx is small (see Figure 1). But x = 1−δ
2δ
¡√
9+1 6 ε − 3
¢
and so, as
δ tends to 1, x does indeed become small. Furthermore, the vertical distance
from (v0(2),v 1(2)) or (v0 (0),v 1 (0)) to p is 1−δ
8δ , which (for δ near 1) is of the
same order as x, and hence less than
√
x. Hence for δ near 1, (v0(2),v 1(2)) and
(v0 (0),v 1 (0)) lie in B.





can indeed be decomposed for δ
near 1. The argument is similar for the other points of B. Hence repetition
p e r m i t sp o i n t st h a ta r en e a r l ye ﬃcient to be attained as equilibria.
To summarize, for the agent to be induced to work in a one-shot principal-
agent relationship, his monetary payment contingent on output must be vari-
able. This variability has no adverse consequences if the agent is risk-neutral,
18but interferes with Pareto optimality if he is risk-averse. Once the relationship
is repeated, the agent’s monetary payment no longer need be made variable; the
agent can be “punished” or “rewarded” through variations in his continuation
payoﬀ.F u r t h e r m o r e , i f δ is near 1, not much variation in these payoﬀsi sr e -
quired to provide adequate incentive –so the equilibrium shortfall from Pareto
optimality is correspondingly small. That is, repetition allows us to exploit the
fact that the Pareto frontier is locally linear.
8P a r t n e r s h i p s
Next let n =2but eliminate agent 0 (the center), so that we are now in a part-
nership (double moral hazard) framework, i.e., neither agent can observe the
other’s action. In this setting, an eﬃcient outcome may be impossible to im-
plement even if the Pareto frontier is linear. Speciﬁcally, consider the following
model based on an example in Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994). Sup-
pose that each player’s action ai can equal w (“work”) or s (“shirk”). Working
imposes a disutility of 3, whereas shirking is costless. There are two possible
output levels, z =0and z =1 2 . If both players work, the probability that
z =1 2is 2
3; if only one works the probability is 1
3; and if neither works it is
0. Output is divisible and can be allocated in any way between the two agents.
Agent i’s utility is
zi − di(ai),
19where zi is his share of total output and di(ai) is his disutility from action
ai (i.e., either 0 or 3).
It is easy to verify that it is eﬃcient for both agents to work and that the
Pareto frontier is the straight line v1 + v2 =2 . Despite the linear preferences,
however, no point on the frontier is implementable. To see this, note that to
induce player i to work (given that the other player is working), his shares —














zi(12) − zi(0) ≥ 9 i =1 ,2. (19)
Adding the two inequalities (19) together, we obtain
12 ≥ 18,
a contradiction. Thus eﬃciency is not implementable.
Informally, to induce an agent to work, the diﬀerence between the outputs
allocated to him in the high and low states must be suﬃciently big (9, to be
precise, and therefore 18 if we add the two agents’ diﬀerences together). But
the diﬀerence between high and low total output is only 12. So to get both
agents to work, output has to be “thrown away” in the low state, i.e., output
must be reduced to -6, which is ineﬃcient. An alternative to throwing away
20output is to resurrect the center (agent 0). Imagine that this agent chips in two
units of output in the high state and takes away 4 in the low state. Then, agents
1 and 2 can be induced to work without any expected eﬃciency loss (the center
breaks even on average: 2
32 − 1
34=0 ). This is basically Holmstr˝ om’s (1982)
interpretation of the Alchian and Demsetz (1972) rationale for separation of
ownership and management in corporations: the owner can serve as a “budget-
breaker” in setting up an eﬃcient incentive scheme for managers.
In studying the principal-agent model above, we noted that the value of
repeating the game was to exploit the fact that a concave frontier is still locally
linear. In our partnership example, however, eﬃciency is not implementable
even when the frontier is linear. Consequently, it should not be surprising that
repetition does not help to restore eﬃciency. Indeed, the partnership example is
closely related to one used by Radner, Myerson, and Maskin (1986) to illustrate
the potential ineﬃciency of repeated game equilibria when there is double moral
hazard.
The ineﬃciency in our partnership example, however, turns out to depend
crucially on the fact that there are only two possible observable outcomes (this
is true as well of the Radner-Myerson-Maskin example). Indeed let us now
m o d i f yt h em o d e ls ot h a tt h e r ea r et h r e ep o s s i b l eo u t p u tl e v e l s ,z =1 2 ,8,0.I f



















, and if both shirk it is (0,0,1).
Once again, it is eﬃcient for both agents to work, and the Pareto frontier
21is described by v1 + v2 =2 . In this case, however, it is possible to implement
any point on the frontier. Speciﬁc a l l y ,s u p p o s ew el e tz2(12) = 12, z1(8) = 8,
and set all the other allocations equal to zero. That is, we give agent 2 all the
output when z =1 2and agent 1 all the output when z =8 . It is straightforward
































Intuitively, it makes sense to allocate agent 1 all the output when z =8 :i f
he had shirked, such an output level would not have been possible; and so the
allocation serves as an eﬀective inducement for his working; similarly, assigning
agent 2 all the output when z =1 2is a good way to reward him for working.
Mathematically, the virtue of having suﬃciently many output levels (in this
case, 3) is that we can satisfy incentive constraints (20) and (21) together with
the eﬃciency conditions
z1(0) + z2(0) = 0
z1(8) + z2(8) = 8
z1(12) + z2(12) = 12
simultaneously. More generally, Radner and Williams (1988) and Legros (1988)
22showed that, as long as agents utilities are linear in output, then for generic
partnership games where the number of output levels is at least m1 + m2 − 1
(where mi is the number of actions in Ai), eﬃciency is implementable. As
Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) showed, a similar result obtains for a
repeated partnership (with δ near 1) without the hypothesis that the Pareto
frontier is linear.
9C o n c l u s i o n
Roy Radner once expressed the wish that a book as elegant as Debreu’s (1957)
analysis of competitive markets might one day be written about nonmarket
institutions (speciﬁcally, the large ﬁrm). His own work on teams and incentives
(not to mention his many contributions to our understanding of information,
and organizational structure) constitutes a good start toward making that wish
come true.
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